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I. Introduction
One of the most heated debates in the current efforts to re-write
the Communications Act has been whether the federal government
should impose Network Neutrality requirements on broadband
service providers. Although there is no consensus on precisely what
"Network Neutrality" means-and thus no consensus on what rules
are required to achieve it-the principle is usually couched in terms
of preserving the "openness" of the Internet so that consumers can
freely access third-party applications over broadband networks
without the fear that the broadband network provider will deteriorate
or degrade the transmission to these third-party applications and
services in favor of their own applications and services. In practice,
the goal of Network Neutrality is to prevent anticompetitive conduct
by placing various regulatory constraints on the behavior of
broadband service providers.
While preventing anticompetitive conduct sounds sensible
enough, it is also possible for a Network Neutrality rule to have the
intent or effect of "commoditizing" broadband transmission and
Internet access services by limiting the ability of broadband service
providers to differentiate their service offerings from those of rival
firms. While we argue neither for nor against the need for Network
Neutrality legislation in this paper, our analysis shows that
policymakers should avoid mandates that may "commoditize"
broadband access services because such a policy approach is likely to
deter facilities-based competition, reduce the expansion and
deployment of advanced communications networks, and increase
prices. Moreover, given the economic characteristics of local
communications networks, policies that promote commoditization of
broadband access could lead to the monopoly provision of advanced
broadband services in many markets. This outcome would harm
consumers substantially.
Our conclusion, while based on a rather technical economic
model, is actually relatively simple and intuitive. Economic theory
suggests that product differentiation is an important component of
competition, particularly in industries with large fixed and sunk costs.
Allowing broadband firms to differentiate their products may make
entry more likely, thereby leading to a less concentrated industry
structure.' Entry with differentiation is superior to the situation in
which policy-mandated bandwidth commoditization results in highly
1. This relationship is well known in economics. See, e.g., J. TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 7 (1995).
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concentrated industry structures, including monopoly.2 Our economic
model indicates that by deterring entry, Network Neutrality rules that
encourage commoditization are clearly bad for consumers (and
probably bad for society as a whole), and this result holds even if
differentiation has no effect on overall demand Since differentiation
is likely to have significant value to consumers and firms, our caution
about such Network Neutrality rules is possibly even conservative.
Economic forces inherent to communications networks tend to
promote concentrated equilibrium industry structures (i.e., few
firms). Consequently, policymakers should always consider how
various policy proposals influence the underlying economics of entry
into communications markets so that the existing entry-limiting
economic conditions are not intensified by regulatory intervention.
As we show in this paper, Network Neutrality rules that encourage
commoditization of broadband service exacerbate this tendency
toward concentration in an industry that is already characterized by
an inherently high equilibrium industry concentration level. This
effect on industry structure actually conflicts with the desires of
Network Neutrality advocates, in that proponents of Network
Neutrality rules often cite to the concentrated nature of the local
market as justifying their concern over discrimination In other
2. The history of communications and video markets clearly indicates that the
market is not conducive to competition among a large number of firms, or in some cases
even few firms. In both domestic and international markets, many communications and
video networks were constructed with significant government subsidies and decades of
protected monopoly. It is well recognized that the financial struggles of interexchange
carriers such as AT&T and MCI driven, in large part, by the commoditization of long
distance services. See, e.g., J. Oldham, AT&T Enters Latest Fare War, Lowering Long-
Distance Rates, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999; K. Taylor, So Long, Long Distance,
available at THE MOTLEY FOOL, Sept. 7, 2004,
http://www.fool.com/News/mft/2004/mft04090712.htm.
3. In our model, social welfare is impacted by network duplication costs, whereas
consumer welfare is affected only by price changes. For social welfare to improve with
entry, the gains to consumers must outweigh the lost profit to firms and the fixed costs of
the entrant.
4. George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, PHOENIX CENTER
POLICY PAPER No. 21: Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and
Convergence (July 2005), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/pcpp/PCPP21Final.pdf (analysis and citations therein. The paper also reveals
that high concentration need not result in poor market performance. Indeed, high
concentration may be the result of intense price competition. In the presence of sunk
costs, however, monopoly is nearly always undesirable, since sunk costs protect the
monopolist from the hit-and-run entry that could create pricing discipline.
5. Prepared Statement of Vinton C. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet
Evangelist, Google Inc., U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation (Feb. 7, 2006) at 7 (on file with author), available at:
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words, Network Neutrality rules that promote even higher levels of
concentration may be a cure that worsens the disease. Therefore, in
considering various Network Neutrality proposals, policymakers
should be aware of the need to balance concerns about discrimination
with the danger that commoditizing the market for broadband
Internet access services may lead to the monopoly provision of
broadband Internet access service in many markets. The result would
be lower broadband penetration rates due to higher broadband prices
and would certainly impede the expansion and technological
advancement of broadband networks in the United States.
Our analysis in this paper is focused. We do not attempt to
address the incentive to discriminate against broadband Internet
access service providers, or model the value to consumers and firms
of network-based differentiation and innovation. Nor do we attempt
to examine comprehensively the myriad of Network Neutrality
proposals, many of which might not present this risk of
commoditization. Our analysis only considers the particular risk that
(effectively) mandated commoditization would have on competition
and entry. Our findings reveal that Network Neutrality rules may be
socially inefficient even if firms never engage in anticompetitive
behavior and even if consumers place no value on network
differentiation and innovation. If consumers and firms do value
network differentiation and innovation, and we certainly expect they
do, then our findings would be substantially strengthened. Network
Neutrality rules, then, are not innocuous simply because firms might
adhere to their intended purpose (nondiscrimination) even without
the imposition of such rules.
After a brief background section, we present an economic model
in Section III that compares consumer and social welfare across
market scenarios that differ in the degree of product differentiation
and competition. Aspects of this economic model are quite technical,
but we summarize the primary findings of the model in Section IV.
Those not interested in the technical details can jump ahead.
H. Background: The Various Shades of Network Neutrality
Network Neutrality proposals exist on a continuum. Some
Network Neutrality proposals focus almost exclusively on
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf ("Cerf Testimony") ("[t]he best long-term
answer to this problem is significantly more broadband competition.").
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nondiscrimination,6 while others include prohibitions on certain forms
of exclusive arrangements for broadband transmission services.7 No
doubt, the rules crafted to handle these particular flavors of Network
Neutrality may unintentionally promote commoditization, but some
Network Neutrality advocates unabashedly assert that the
commoditization of local broadband Internet access should be the
goal of policymakers. For example, David Isenberg, who first coined
the term "Stupid Network," explicitly calls for the government to
create a "commodity network," where broadband transport is
divested entirely from higher level services.8 Our analysis in this
paper reveals an important problem with this approach: this type of
forced commoditization could deter entry, possibly resulting in
monopolization of broadband access and slow deployment and
improvements in broadband infrastructure.9
While this paper is (to our knowledge) the first formal economic
analysis of this particular concern regarding Network Neutrality, we
are not the first to recognize the potential undesirable market power
consequences of Network Neutrality-driven commoditization. For
example, Professor Christopher S. Yoo recently opined that if
"improving the competitiveness of the last mile becomes the central
goal of broadband policy, it becomes clear that network neutrality is
potentially problematic and counterproductive."'" The problem,
Professor Yoo argues, is that:
network neutrality can reinforce the sources of market failure in
telecommunications markets by exacerbating the impact of up-
front, fixed costs and by network economic effects. Conversely,
6. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005) (which focuses exclusively on "restrictions on
the use of an Internet connection"); Letter from Tim Wu, University of Virginia Law
School, and Lawrence Lessig, Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission, in CS Docket 02-52 (Aug. 22, 2003) (on file with
author).
7. John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband, Public Knowledge
White Paper (Feb. 6, 2006) at 40-42, available at- http://static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-
net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf (noting that "a properly tailored Net Neutrality rule"
would allow differentiated tiers, provided that those tiers "not offer exclusive access to the
higher bandwidth levels to providers selected by the network operator.").
8. D. Isenberg and D. Weinberger, The Paradox of the Best Network, available at:
www.netparadox.com ("Just as the Internet separates transport from service, the
incumbent telephone companies should be separated into transport companies and service
companies."); D. Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, COMPUTER TELEPHONY,
Aug. 1997, at 16-26.
9. Isenberg and Weinberger, id., appear fully aware that their "commodity network"
is unlikely to be financially viable without government intervention.
10. Christopher S. Yoo, Promoting Broadband Through Network Diversity, Feb. 6,
2006, at 3, available at: http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=286.
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economic theory shows how allowing network owners to
differentiate the service they offer can allow smaller producers to
survive despite having lower sales volumes and higher per-unit
costs by differentiating their offerings to appeal to a subsegment of
the larger market."
Equally as important, even avowed Network Neutrality proponents
agree that a "commoditization" approach may have significant
consequences. For example, Professor Tim Wu argues that
the concept of network neutrality is not as simple as some IP
[Internet Protocol] partisans have suggested.... Network design is
an exercise in tradeoffs... IP's neutrality is actually a tradeoff
between upward (application) and downward (connection)
neutrality. If it is upward, or application neutrality that consumers
care about, principles of downward neutrality may be a necessary
sacrifice.
Similarly, Isenberg and Weinberger, two of the staunchest advocates
of Network Neutrality, notes that "the best [i.e., stupid] network is
the hardest to make money running." As a solution, Isenberg and
Weinberger reject a market solution and instead foresee a rate-of-
return regulated and sometimes subsidized network as the "best"
future for domestic broadband service.
13
Our analysis highlights the need to balance Network Neutrality
principles against the effect that the imposition and enforcement of
those principles might have on the prospects for increasing
concentration in the broadband Internet access market. The Federal
Communications Commission's 2005 Policy Statement on the
regulatory framework for broadband Internet access stands as one
example where policymakers attempt to walk this tightrope. 4 Each of
the FCC's four broadband Internet access principles contains the
11. Id. at 4.
12. Wu, supra note 6, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. at 147-148.
13. Isenberg & Weinberger, supra note 8 ("the best network is the hardest to make
money running. So who builds it? Who runs it? Who fixes it when it breaks? And who
develops the next generations of faster, simpler infrastructure?"; "The transport
companies would be have [sic] government incentives (e.g., assured return on investment),
to make fiber, pole attachment, and right of way available to all service providers.").
14. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, FCC 05-151 (rel. Sept. 23, 2005) ("FCC Policy Statement").
The FCC Policy Statement states that, "to encourage broadband deployment and preserve
and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet" (1) consumers are
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice; (2) consumers are entitled to
run applications and services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3)
consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers (emphasis in original). Although
the Commission did not adopt rules in this regard, it has said that it will incorporate these
principles into its ongoing policymaking activities.
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same deliberately italicized preamble-that principle is "to encourage
broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet. "5 Moreover, the FCC
Policy Statement includes as a principle the idea that "consumers are
entitled to competition among network providers., 16 The stated basis
for this principle is the Preamble of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which describes the Act's intent "to promote competition and
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality
services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies."
With these phrases, the FCC Policy Statement appears to
recognize the need to balance these rival considerations. In that
balancing act, the FCC perhaps recognized that Network Neutrality
rules that promote commoditization may lead to high industry
concentration or monopoly and thus are incompatible with the
legislative mandate to "promote competition," "secure lower prices
and higher quality services," or "encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies." The development of Network
Neutrality principles by policymakers must necessarily be nuanced
and flexible because of these competing concerns, particularly given
the economic characteristics of local broadband networks.
III. Economic Model: Commoditization, Industry Structure,
and Network Neutrality
In our formal economic treatment of the issue, we simplify the
various Network Neutrality proposals by focusing on one important
consequence (intentional or otherwise) of some of these proposals.
Our particular concern is with regard to Network Neutrality rules that
would effectively "commoditize" broadband access to the Internet by
limiting the ability of a network firm to offer products that are
somehow differentiated from other networks (or, at least, perceived
to be). This restriction on network differentiation can manifest itself
in several ways. For example, rules may require broadband providers
to offer access services separate and apart from affiliated content (i.e.,
privacy, security, packet prioritization, VoIP services) or limit the
manner in which they can charge for various ancillary services.
15. Preamble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56 (1996).
16. FCC Policy Statement, supra note 14, at n. 14.
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In markets with fixed and/or sunk costs, differentiation can be an
important driver of market structure. 7 In commoditized markets,
firms have nothing to compete over but price. Differentiation,
alternately, allows firms to improve consumer welfare not only by
price cuts but by creating better price-quality offerings and innovative
new products and services. Certainly, price competition is desirable,
but when price is the only choice in a market with large fixed/sunk
costs and low marginal costs (like local broadband networks), the
result of permitting price-only competition is a tendency toward
monopoly (the situation where entry does not occur at all, which
deprives consumers of that price competition). By giving firms
alternate avenues of rivalry, differentiation allows for entry and gives
consumers the benefits of not only price competition but of increased
choice and innovation."
17. See, e.g., A. Shaked & J. Sutton, Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure,
36 JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 131-146 (1987); J. SUTTON, SUNK COST AND
MARKET STRUCTURE (1995); Ford, Koutsky, & Spiwak, supra note 4, at 23. The
economic model developed in this paper is consistent with this earlier research, though we
assume that market size is held constant, endogenous sunk costs are zero, and all product
differentiation is horizontal in nature. While the effects of these features of the Sutton-
type models are, no doubt, interesting, our model format was selected so that the welfare
effects of various policies could be assessed.
18. Significantly, economic theory suggests that product differentiation often impedes
oligopolistic coordination. As observed by Kaserman and Mayo:
[W]here firms in the market produce a product whose differences are either
nonexistent or so minor that the only dimension of competition between firms is
price[,] it is relatively easy for firms to agree to establish an anticompetitive price.
Where firms compete in many dimensions (for example, price, quality, and new
service or product innovations), however, it becomes more difficult to
successfully collude because firms will need to establish limits on competition in
each of the relevant dimensions.
D. KASERMAN and J. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION (1995) at 159; see also, F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 279 (1990) ("When
products are heterogeneously differentiated, the terms of rivalry become
multidimensional, and the coordination problem grows in complexity by leaps and
bounds."); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION j 404c3 (2002) (product complexity,
differentiation, or variety "multiply avenues of rivalry and hence the decisions that must
be coordinated. Even if firms reach a coordinated price, they may continue to compete by
improving product quality."); see also, In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report & Order, FCC
Docket No. 94-31 (rel. March 7, 1994) at 149 ("[c]omplex pricing structures, such as are used
in the cellular industry, make it difficult for a carrier to sustain collusive pricing."); but cf., S.
MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 116-7 (1993) ("[p]roduct differentiation
reduces the incremental profit to be gained by departing form a joint-profit-maximizing
configuration because product differentiation insulates rivals' markets and reduces the
extent to which a single firm can lure rivals' customers into its own market.").
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A. Model
We model Network Neutrality as requiring homogeneous goods.
We consider entry by a new firm into a market initially controlled by
a monopoly. We specify a demand model that allows continuity
between homogeneous and differentiated goods, and that does not
allow differentiation to alter the marginal benefit of units sold. The
latter restriction is important since it ensures that our theoretical
analysis is conservative. In our model, the only effect of
differentiation is to make goods less-close substitutes so that firms
pursue more independent pricing policies and the reaction functions
become steeper. Clearly, our choice to ignore the benefits of
differentiation in the theoretical model understates the undesirable
consequences of Network Neutrality rules that lead to
commoditization. Differentiation undoubtedly increases the marginal
value of units sold, since there are many benefits that arise from
differentiation. In particular, differentiation can increase consumer
welfare by giving consumers more desirable price-quality
combinations. Further, a key motivator of innovation is an attempt by
firms to provide a better product that differentiates themselves from
rivals. Thus, our analysis-by focusing on entry alone-grossly
understates the negative effects of commoditization of broadband
Internet access services that results from Network Neutrality
mandates.
In our economic model, price competition can be either Cournot
competition in quantities or Bertrand competition in prices.9 There
are sunk costs to entry and, for simplicity, constant marginal cost of
service which is the same for both firms. We basically analyze a
simple extensive form game with the timeline illustrated in Figure 1.
19. With Cournot competition, rival firms choose the quantity they wish to offer for
sale. Each firm maximizes profit on the assumption that the quantity produced by its rivals
is not affected by its own output decisions. The Cournot equilibrium asserts that prices
and quantities approach competitive levels as the number of firms supplying the market
increase. With Bertrand competition, rivals choose price rather than quantity. The
Bertrand equilibrium (with homogeneous goods) has price equal to marginal cost with
only two firms. Thus, if there are any fixed or sunk entry costs, entry will not occur. For
more detail, see S. Martin, id., at ch. 2.
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We use the following inverse demand system,
pi = (x-f3 P , qj j (1)
where p, is the price of good i (sold by firm i); t and 0 are positive
demand parameters; q, is the output of firm/good i; and 0 is a product
differentiation parameter where 0 < 0 _< 1. Note that p, is continuous
on 0, and if 0 = 0 we have the pure monopoly case; 0 = 1 we have
identical goods; and for intermediate cases we have 0 < 0 < 1.
The direct demand relationships are
qi =-P1 (-(1-- )Pi +( I O-_o)Pj (2)
which are undefined at 0 = 1, unsurprisingly.20 Notice that if p, = p,
then
q 1 (x-p) (3)
20. With homogeneous goods, the demand elasticities are infinite at the rival's price.
Figure 1. Timeline






(t = 0) .
(t=0) Entrant c = 0
Incumbent t = monopoly
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This demand system has many desirable properties. First, the market
remains the same size despite entry. In essence, we can view the
monopoly as merely having two markets of equal size prior to entry,
where an entrant takes one of the markets after entry. This property
is key since in this model differentiation per se has no benefit to
consumers. As we discuss above, this is an unrealistic but
conservative assumption of the analysis, in part because
differentiation might serve to expand the market by providing
consumers more desirable price-quantity options. Thus, in this
system, any effect from differentiation solely influences prices and
competition, not consumer willingness to pay. By design, this
specification renders highly conservative theoretical predictions, since
we normally expect competition among differentiated goods to
increase the size of the market.22 However, this design allows us to
speak separately about the role of consumer valuation of variety and
its pure competitive effect. We relax this assumption later in the text.
Other desirable properties of the demand relationships are
technical in nature. For example, this specification provides for closed
form expressions for profits, surplus, and prices. 23 Additionally, the
model has unique, symmetric equilibria whenever entry occurs, and
these equilibria seem sensible. For example, prices under
differentiation converge to simple Cournot price as 0= 1
(homogeneous goods competition), and converge to monopoly price
as 0 = 0 (homogeneous good with no substitutes).
In order to evaluate the effects of Network Neutrality rules that
promote homogeneity, we need to solve the model for prices,
quantities, and welfare in five specific cases:
Monopoly, 0 = 1 (one variety)
Monopoly, 0 < 1 (two varieties)
Oligopoly, 0 = 1 (simple Cournot competition)
Oligopoly, 0 < 1 (differentiated Cournot competition)
Oligopoly/Competitive, 0 = 1 (simple Bertrand competition)
21. Regardless of 0, the consumer buys both goods in equal quantities whenever their
prices are equal, regardless of what the common price may be. Thus, this model is a
representative consumer model.
22. The analysis is theoretically conservative in that if differentiation increased value,
then we could simply pick an increase in value that makes Network Neutrality rules
undesirable.
23. That is, all these values can be expressed analytically in terms of a bounded




Note that we evaluate both Cournot competition in quantities
and Bertrand competition in prices. If we evaluated Bertrand
competition alone, then the case against Network Neutrality would be
significantly stronger. So, again, our analysis is theoretically
conservative.
Finally, we assume that c is the common marginal unit cost to
both firms; E is the sunk entry cost of a potential entrant; and F is the
fixed costs (also sunk) of incumbents, which we normalize to zero for
strategic analysis.
1. Case 1: Monopoly, O = 1
In the case of monopoly, the objective profit function for the firm
is
n = 2(p- c)1((x -p). (4)
The equilibrium values (denoted with an *) of price and quantity are
p _ +c
Rn =2 ' (5)
q* a-c
* (6)
Producer surplus (profit, n), consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare
(W) are
* (a -C12
t 23 ' (7)
CS = (Cc- c)2  (8
= ( 3 c) 2 - (8)4P3
W = 7 +CS 3 (a-C)2  (9)
8 f3
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These values are important in that they serve as a comparison point
for alternative market structures.
2. Case 2: Monopoly, 0< 1
As mentioned above, the demand system is designed so that we
essentially have a monopolist that sells in two markets. Since we wish
to compare duopoly to monopoly with either identical or
differentiated goods/services, we must first evaluate whether there is
any welfare improvement resulting from the monopolist
differentiating its products.
In this case, the monopolist sells two goods (1, 2) with 0 < 0 < 1.
We can show that differentiation (0 < 1) has no direct welfare effect.
The objective function is
1
max (p, - c) - (a - P1 - Oc + 0p 2 )
P11P2 (10)
+ (p2 - c) I (-p - O + Op1 ).
13(1-0)
The equilibrium values for price and quantity are
a+C (11)P; P2=- ;(1
2
Q_ (a - C)2 (12)
2P
Since the equilibrium values in Equations (11) and (12) are identical
to those in Equations (5) and (6), there is no welfare effect of changes
in 0 in the monopoly case. Thus, in this model, we can treat monopoly
generically in our welfare comparisons.
3. Case 3: Duopoly, 0=1
Our purpose is to evaluate the welfare consequences of Network
Neutrality rules that encourage commoditization of broadband
service. As one point of interest, consider the case of simple Cournot
competition in quantities with homogeneous products. Price is
20071
P= a-(q, +q2) (13)
and profits for firm i, Good 1, are
(xi  - Ro- (q, + q2)-C q, (14)
and similarly for firm j and Good 2. Equilibrium values for price and
quantity are




Producer surplus (profit, r), consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare
(W) are
T =2(-c)- 2  (17)
9 1
CS= 4 (ct-c)2  (18)
9 f3
= t + CS = 8 (a -c) 2  (19)
9 p3
Importantly, Equations (17) and thus (19) would need to be adjusted
for the presence of fixed or sunk costs, meaning that the total (or
social) welfare effect of entry must consider the duplication of fixed
costs. Assuming that the incumbent's fixed costs are entirely sunk,
Equation (19) is
[29:149HASTINGS COMM/ENT LTJ
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W =n+CS-=8 (a-c)2 E. (20)
9 P3
Comparing (20) to (9), we see that if E = 0, then total welfare is
higher with competition than without (i.e., 8/9 > 3/,). If E > 0, then the
size relationship between Equations (20) and (9) depends on the size
of E. While total welfare may rise or fall, the effects on consumers of
entry are unambiguous. Comparing Equations (18) and (8), we see
clearly that entry improves consumer surplus.
4. Case 4: Duopoly, 9< 1
At the core of this analysis is the question of the role of
differentiation on entry. We consider that case now. In this instance,
we have Cournot competition in quantities with differentiated goods
(i.e., 0 < 1). Using the concept of Nash Equilibrium, we solve
max r11 = a- 0- ); (21)
maxq2 + q _ (22)
aq2 (1 -0 )+0)
The only Nash point is the symmetric point
.q (X-c) (1+0) (23)
2P3 (2 + 0)
with prices of
. p +c(l+0) (24)
2+0
Notice that q* and p* are continuous and well-behaved in 0, with
< 0,
ao ao
aq* = >q; > o.
ao ao
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Also, 7t = (p* - c)q* is monotonically decreasing in 0.
Equilibrium values of interest include
(a -c) 2 (1+ 0)
(2+0)2'
13 (2 + 0)' ,  (26)
KS;= (a-c) 2 (1+0)2
2PS (2 + 0)2; (27)
- CS1 =(a-c) 2 (1+0)2
sP (2 + 0)2' (28)
where the last is determined by the equal-price line integral. These
values are used to compute the relevant conditions for welfare
improving entry and differentiation in Section IV.A below.
5. Case 5: Bertrand Duopoly, O= 1
In the case of Bertrand price competition with homogenous
goods, the equilibrium values are p* = c and t* = 0 (except for
fixed/sunk costs). In other words, Bertrand price competition renders
price equal to marginal cost and profits equal to zero with duopoly.
This solution is the familiar textbook result. Here, if there are any
fixed and/or sunk costs of entry, then entry does not occur and the
monopolist is unchallenged, so that the prevailing market price and
quantity are given by Equations (5) and (6) and welfare components
by Equation (7), (8), and (9)-the monopoly outcome.
IV. Evaluation of the Results
By comparing the market structure scenarios detailed in the
previous section, we can evaluate Network Neutrality proposals
based on how those rules affect potential entry, consumer welfare,
and profits. Recall that our interpretation and discussion of "Network
Neutrality rules" is limited to proposals that would effectively
mandate homogeneity across providers of broadband service.
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A. Network Neutrality and Efficiency
Using the equilibrium values from the five alternate competitive
outcomes outlined in the previous section, we can summarize
succinctly our findings as follows. Recall that E is the sunk entry cost
of a potential entrant, and n is profit. Based on the analysis above,
Network Neutrality rules that promote commoditization are socially
inefficient under the following three conditions:
1. nr(duopoly, 0 = 1) < E;
2. n(duopoly, 0 < 1) > E;
3. W(duopoly, 0 < 1) - E > W(monopoly).
These conditions are summarized as follows. Condition (1) states that
a duopoly profit with homogeneous products (0 = 1) is insufficient to
cover sunk entry costs; as a result, in this case, entry would not occur.
Condition (2) states that duopoly profit with differentiated products
(0 < 1) is larger than entry costs; as a result, in this case, entry would
occur. Condition (3) states that the total welfare with differentiated
duopoly is larger than total welfare with monopoly.24 These three
conditions imply that Network Neutrality rules are socially inefficient
if they reduce the number of firms serving the market, and the excluded
firms would have been efficient entrants from a social perspective.
We can show, based on the above logic, that Network Neutrality
is inefficient from the social point of view whenever the prospects for
post-entry competition are suitably severe enough so that firms do
not enter the market.
24. As stated clearly by Motta:
Since market power decreases with the number of firms in the industry, one
might be tempted to conclude that the larger the number of firms the higher the
welfare. This is not the case, however, when firms have to incur (recurrent or set-
up) fixed costs. Indeed, the presence of fixed costs - which gives rise to scale
economies - implies the existence of a trade-off. On the one hand, a higher
number of firms entails more competition in the market and lower prices, which
undoubtedly increases consumer surplus (and allocative efficiency). On the other
hand, it also entails a duplication of fixed costs, which represents a loss in terms
of (static) productive efficiency. The net effect on welfare is a priori ambiguous.
M. MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 51 (2004). See also N.
Mankiw & M.D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 48, 48-58 (1986). With only a small amount of sunk costs, however, the
possibility of welfare-reducing entry declines. See J. H. Nachbar, B. C. Petersen and 1.
Hwang, Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry, 46 JOURNAL OF
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 317-332 (1998).
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Proposition. Suppose Bertrand competition occurs with entry
and 0 = 1, but differentiated competition occurs if 0 < 1. If E is
positive but not too large, then Network Neutrality is socially
inefficient.
Proof. Under Bertrand competition, duopoly profit on entry with
0 = 1 is zero, so any positive sunk entry costs prevents entry. Without
Network Neutrality requiring 0 = 1, a firm may enter with 0 < 1,
whenever
( -c)2 (1+0)= 2+) > E > 0. (29)f3 (2+0)2
If so, then welfare from differentiated duopoly exceeds monopoly
welfare. Recalling that monopoly welfare is invariant to the degree of
differentiation in this model, Network Neutrality is socially
inefficient.
A review of the conditions required for Network Neutrality,
interpreted as a requirement for commodity competition between
firms, to be socially inefficient easily explains the proposition, and the
conditions under which it can be weakened. Lacking brand identity,
entry involves prices driven to incremental costs, with no hope of
sunk cost recovery. This outcome is clearly socially undesirable
whenever entry is then precluded, since price remains at the
monopoly level. Thus, the analysis turns on the degree to which
relaxation of net neutrality rules allow potential entrants to
differentiate their offerings sufficiently from rivals to recover sunk
entry costs. Importantly, this conclusion does not require the
assumption that differentiation per se has any social benefit.
B. Network Neutrality and Consumers
The Conditions also provide us the situations in which consumers
would be harmed by this particular Network Neutrality regime. Note
that if there are no sunk cost of entry (that is, E = 0), then Condition
(3) is always true as long as rivals offer somewhat substitutable goods
or services (that is, 0 > 0), no matter how small that substitutability
may be. In essence, this means that the gains to consumers from
competition will always be larger than the reduction in profits to firms
(as long as there are no fixed/sunk entry costs, or ignoring such costs).
Importantly, we find that entry always improves consumer surplus, so
the social desirability of entry relates only to the effect of entry on
firm profits and the duplication of fixed costs. Our model shows that
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consumers are always better off with more entry-so if Network
Neutrality rules reduce entry, then consumers are unambiguously
worse off.
C. Differentiation that Increases the Marginal Value of Goods
Thus far we have assumed that there is no benefit from
differentiation per se. However, differentiation has value for both
consumers and firms. To illustrate what affect on our conclusions a
positive value from differentiation has, suppose this value is captured
fully by consumers, and denote it S. This benefit from differentiation
alters Condition (3), which would now read
3'. W(duopoly, 0 < 1) - E + S > W(monopoly).
Since S is positive, Condition (3') is easier to satisfy than
Condition (3). So, if differentiation is valuable, then Network
Neutrality rules that discourage entry are more likely to be
inefficient.
If, alternately, both firms and consumers capture some of this
benefit (SF and S, respectively), we must modify (2) and (3) to read
2'. ir(duopoly, 0 < 1) + SF > E;
3". W(duopoly, 0 < 1) - E +SF +S, > E.
Again, if differentiation increases the value of service so that SF
and Sc are positive, then Network Neutrality is more likely to be
socially inefficient since Conditions (2') and (3") are more easily
satisfied than Conditions (2) and (3).
D. Summary
In summary, our economic model suggests that if one codifies an
approach to Network Neutrality that causes the commoditization of
broadband Internet access service, then those rules are inefficient if
they reduce the number of firms that can offer that service. In a
market which Network Neutrality advocates frequently describe as a
"duopoly," an increase in concentration (i.e., monopoly) is likely to
have substantial negative effects on market outcomes. Network
Neutrality rules that limit entry appear in this way to be a bad deal for
consumers but remain an open question from a social welfare
perspective, due to the potential cost of network duplication that
entry presents. As long as the benefits to consumers from entry and
competition exceed these network duplication costs, Network
Neutrality rules that promote commoditization would be inefficient.
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V. Conclusion
The Network Neutrality debate presents a difficult challenge for
policymakers. In particular, policymakers need to be aware that
Network Neutrality rules themselves can have the effect of making
competition and entry in an already concentrated market even less
likely in the future. Given the cost characteristics of communications
networks (high fixed and/or sunk costs and low marginal cost), forced
commoditization of broadband access can plausibly render monopoly
outcomes. Our analysis suggests that Network Neutrality rules that
promote commoditization of broadband access services will be
inefficient and harmful if such rules deter efficient entry.25 As shown
above, if entry is deterred, then Network Neutrality rules of the type
evaluated here are unambiguously bad for consumers. Accordingly,
while proponents of Network Neutrality have called competition the
"best long-term solution" to the problem they seek to resolve, our
model shows that the cure promised by commoditizing Internet
access could codify and might in fact exacerbate the highly
concentrated industry structure that it is attempting to address 6
Our analysis in this paper is, admittedly, focused. We do not
attempt to address all of the relevant issues in the Network Neutrality
debate. What our analysis does show is that efforts to "commoditize"
broadband networks, intentional or otherwise, in the name of
"Network Neutrality" may in fact increase industry concentration,
plausibly rendering monopoly. If entry is discouraged, then our
analysis shows (under the conditions assumed) that consumers are
unambiguously worse off.
Our analysis also reveals that even under conditions where firms
have no incentive to discriminate (or simply choose not to act on such
incentives) and sabotage third-party application providers, the
imposition of Network Neutrality legislation or regulation is not
costless. If Network Neutrality rules encourage commoditization,
then such rules may alter industry structure, thereby reducing
consumer and potentially even social welfare. Thus, Network
Neutrality legislation or regulation should not be viewed by
25. By "efficient entry" we mean entry that increases social welfare by raising
consumer surplus by more than the reduction in firm profits and the fixed costs of
duplication.
26. One important Network Neutrality proponent, Vinton Cerf, has flatly stated that
"[t]he best long-term answer to this problem is significantly more broadband
competition." Cerf Testimony, supra note 5, at 7.
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policymakers as costless simply by virtue of the absence of
anticompetitive discriminatory actions by network firms.
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